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Abstract 
We investigate the economic consequences of sickness and death and the manner in 
which poor urban households in Bangladesh respond to such events. Based on panel 
data we assess the effects of morbidity and mortality episodes on household income, 
medical spending, labour supply and consumption. We find that despite maintaining 
household labour supply, serious illness exerts a negative effect on income for the 
poor. However, the estimates do not reject consumption smoothing. The most 
prominent responses to finance current needs are increasing household debt through 
borrowing and depleting productive assets, both of which have detrimental effects on 
future consumption.  
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I. Introduction 
In recent years, the economic consequences of episodes of morbidity and mortality in 
developing countries have received increasing academic and policy attention (for 
instance, Gertler and Gruber 2002, Asfaw and von Braun 2004, McIntyre et al. 2006, 
Wagstaff 2007, Gertler et al. 2009, Genoni 2012, Sparrow et al. 2014). In the absence 
of health and life insurance, serious illnesses or the death of a family member are 
likely to push vulnerable households who rely heavily on their labour, deeper into 
penury. Households experiencing unexpected bouts of illness or the death of a family 
member are likely to incur income losses to the extent that they rely on wage income 
and at the same time be forced to spend a larger fraction of their household budget on 
health care. To cope with such events and maintain consumption, households may 
liquidate assets, resort to intra-household labour substitution, borrow or withdraw 
children from school with potentially deleterious consequences for future household 
welfare.1   
In one of the earliest studies to investigate the economic effects of illnesses, 
Townsend (1994), based on ICRISAT panel data from rural India, concluded that 
after controlling for village-level consumption, an idiosyncratic shock such as illness 
measured by the percentage of the year that an adult male was sick, had no effect on 
household consumption. Using the same data base Kochar (1995) found that the 
illness of a male household member especially during the peak period of the 
agricultural cycle was associated with a decline in wage income and increased 
informal borrowing.  Taken together, these two studies suggest that while households 
may be able to retain consumption at least in the short run, this may come at the risk 
of future impoverishment. It also highlights the importance of jointly analysing the 
effects of illnesses on income, consumption and coping strategies. 
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In general, the evidence on household ability to insure consumption against ill-
health is mixed. In a nuanced analysis that supports a distinction between minor and 
more severe illnesses, Gertler and Gruber (2002) use a large panel data set from rural 
Indonesia to show that while households are able to insure consumption against 70 
percent of high-frequency minor illnesses, they are able to protect themselves against 
only 30 percent of low-frequency illnesses that limit the physical functioning of 
family members.  Also based on data from Indonesia, Gertler et al. (2009) and 
Nguyen and Mangyo (2010) conclude that households are unable to protect their 
consumption against large health shocks and chronic illnesses. In contrast, Genoni 
(2012) finds no evidence of imperfect consumption smoothing in Indonesia while 
Sparrow et al. (2014) report that it is only informal sector workers and the poor who 
are unable to protect their consumption. Studies for other countries that show that 
households are only partly able to smooth consumption, especially in the event of 
large infrequent shocks and chronic illness, include Dercon and Krishnan (2000) and 
Asfaw and Braun (2004) for Ethiopia, and Wagstaff (2007) for Vietnam, whereas 
Mohanan (2013) finds little evidence of imperfect smoothing in India and De Weerdt 
and Dercon (2006) find evidence of consumption smoothing through networks in 
Tanzania. Pertinent to the current context, based on panel data from rural Bangladesh, 
Skoufias and Quisumbing (2005) find no effect of male or female illnesses on 
household consumption. While, in a more recent paper, also based on panel data from 
rural Bangladesh, Islam and Maitra (2012) report that consumption smoothing is 
imperfect in the case of a large shock. 
While there are several reasons for the differences in the degree of 
consumption smoothing reported across studies, of primary concern in the relatively 
recent papers in this genre (e.g. Wagstaff 2007; Genoni 2012, Mohanan 2013, 
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Sparrow et al. 2014) are the transmission channels through which ill-health and 
mortality affect consumption and identification of the strategies adopted by 
households to maintain consumption.  Indeed, the effects of mortality and morbidity 
on current consumption and the ability of households to (partially) maintain 
consumption may be a misleading indicator of the economic impacts of such events, 
especially if consumption is maintained through incurring high-cost debt (e.g. 
Mohanan 2013; Ambrosius and Cuecuecha 2013), selling assets (e.g. Islam and 
Maitra 2012) or foregoing human capital investments in children (Mottaleb et al. 
2015). Echoing this view, Chetty and Looney (2006) argue that focusing on the effect 
of a shock on consumption is not very informative without determining why and how 
households smooth consumption. 
This paper uses data from urban Bangladesh to add to the relatively thin 
literature which explores the transmission channels, coping responses and economic 
consequences of mortality and morbidity episodes. In the Bangladeshi context, a 
number of studies (Carrin et al. 1999, Kabir et al. 2000, Begum and Sen 2004) have 
examined the effects of illnesses on the livelihoods of rickshaw pullers and more 
generally the urban poor. These studies suggest that ill health is the single most 
important factor influencing the (downward) economic mobility of households. 
However, while these papers yield useful insights they do not establish causal effects 
of health shocks on economic outcomes. 
Our empirical analysis relies on longitudinal data and examines the effect of 
serious illnesses and the recent death of a household member on medical expenditure, 
income, labour supply and consumption. An assessment of the effect of health shocks 
on these various outcomes, as opposed to focusing only on the overall effect on 
consumption, is likely to provide insights on the channels through which health 
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shocks affect households. We also study the strategies adopted by households to deal 
with shocks and subsequently investigate the effect of the most commonly used 
coping strategies on future consumption. 
An additional novelty is the focus on urban households as compared to the 
bulk of the literature which deals with such issues in a rural context.2 It is likely that 
due to factors such as differences in occupation and access to informal credit, rural 
and urban households react differently to different types of shocks. A review of 
studies which have examined the effects of various shocks, albeit not health shocks, 
suggests that rural households are more vulnerable to covariate shocks while urban 
households display greater vulnerability to idiosyncratic shocks (see Günther and 
Harttgen 2009).  
With regard to health shocks in the Bangladesh context, Begum and Sen 
(2004) and BBS-UNICEF (2010) argue that given their occupations which may be 
physically more demanding, on average smaller household size, less flexible working 
arrangements and less extensive social networks, urban slum households may be more 
vulnerable to health shocks as compared to rural households and at the same time may 
be less able to access informal sources of credit. Furthermore, as shown in BBS-
UNICEF (2010), in Bangladesh, due to the concentration of various government and 
NGO human development programmes in rural areas, the urban poor, especially those 
residing in urban slums, have lower access to basic services which may also make 
them more vulnerable to health shocks as compared to their rural counterparts. While 
we cannot offer a comparative analysis of the effects of health shocks on rural and 
urban households, which is a drawback, we contribute by providing, to the best of our 
knowledge, the only study that quantifies the economic risk from morbidity and 
mortality specifically for poor urban households. 
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The paper is organised as follows: Section II outlines the setting and the data 
while section III lays out the empirical framework. Section IV discusses the results 
while section V summarizes and concludes the paper.  
 
II. The setting, data and descriptive analysis  
The setting 
According to the latest available figures, Bangladesh is one of the most densely 
populated countries in the world (1111 individuals per square kilometre) with 27 
percent of its 160 million population living in urban areas. Driven by the rapid inflow 
of rural migrants due to poverty and environmental reasons, urban population growth 
(3.5 percent per annum between 2005-2010) far outstrips the corresponding figure for 
rural areas (1 percent), contributing to the growth of slums. An estimated 60 percent 
of the urban population lives in slums.3 At a national level, health facilities are limited 
with 0.6 hospital beds and 0.4 registered physicians per thousand persons in 2011 
which is substantially lower than other developing countries.4 Insurance coverage is 
almost non-existent and in 2011, out-of- pocket payments accounted for about 96.6 
percent of private health expenditure.5 
 This study is set in the slums of Dinajpur, a city of about 270,000 residents 
located in the north-western region of Bangladesh, about 400 kilometres from Dhaka. 
The town consists of 80 communities of which 59 are classified as slum communities. 
The slum communities are integrated into the city and slum-dwellers are typically 
engaged in the informal sector and in occupations such as trading and hawking, 
domestic work, rickshaw pulling, brick breaking and construction. In terms of 
government health facilities, the town has a 500 bed public general hospital. In 
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addition, there are a large number of pharmacies, private clinics and diagnostic 
centres as well as a range of religious and spiritual healers.  
 
Data 
This study relies on data from the SHAHAR (Supporting Household Activities for 
Health, Assets, and Revenue) Dinajpur Survey which was conducted in slums and 
low-income settlements within the municipal areas of Dinajpur in 2002 and 2003 by 
CARE-Bangladesh and the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).  
Based on observed levels of poverty, social cohesion, community size, and 
environmental hazards, the 59 slum communities in Dinajpur were assigned a 
vulnerability score. Of these, fourteen slums with a high vulnerability score were 
selected for an intervention by CARE. Based on power calculations, a simple random 
sample of 614 households was drawn from the selected slums. The sample represents 
about 60 percent of the overall slum population of Dinajpur (for details, see 
Buttenheim 2008).6  
 Three survey rounds were conducted with the first round taking place in July 
and August 2002 followed by round 2 in March 2003 and round 3 in August and 
September 2003. These three survey rounds were combined to create a panel data set. 
In the first round, enumerators successfully contacted and interviewed 585 households 
or 95 percent of the desired sample of 614 households. In the second round, data were 
collected from 567 households (92 percent of the original sample, 97 percent of the 
first round households) and in the final round 553 households (90 percent of the 
original sample, 95 percent of the first round households). A sample attrition rate of 5 
percent is quite small, suggesting that the data are unlikely to be afflicted by attrition 
bias. More formally, based on data from the first round, a probit regression with drop 
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out as the dependent variable indicates that except for household size there is no 
systematic difference in various observed characteristics between households who 
drop out from the sample and those who remain. Most notably there is no evidence 
that the incidence of morbidity or mortality is systematically linked to dropping out 
from the sample.7   
The surveys gathered information on household composition, education, 
employment, savings and credit, household food and non-food consumption, assets, 
and most pertinently for this paper - on various shocks affecting households, their 
financial consequences and household responses to these shocks.  
 To complement the quantitative data, in July 2010, qualitative information was 
collected in six of Dinajpur’s slum communities. The aim was to explore and 
understand household conceptualization of health shocks and the manner in which 
households deal with such events. Data gathering approaches included semi-
structured interviews with 11 households (selected based on variation in terms of age, 
occupation, and gender) who had experienced a recent morbidity or mortality event, 
three focus group discussions of five to seven individuals and interviews with five key 
informants (a traditional healer, an NGO official, hospital nurse, health worker and 
community leader).  
 
Descriptive analysis – shocks and coping  
The survey solicited information on 26 different types of shocks that may affect 
households. Across the three survey rounds, about 32 percent of the total household-
observations indicate the presence of a shock. While households face an array of 
shocks, by far the most common (49 percent) is a serious illness - an illness which 
prevents a household member from undertaking normal activities - in the last one year 
(see Table 1). The death of a household member accounted for about 8 percent of the 
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shocks.8 Specifically with regard to sickness and death, 168 households report a 
health shock in round 1, while in rounds 2 and 3, the number of households reporting 
such events appears to decline sharply to 58 and 82 households (see Table 2). 
However, since rounds 2 and 3 were conducted six months after the preceding 
surveys, in practice the responses to the mortality and morbidity questions in rounds 2 
and 3 cover the six month period preceding the previous survey rather than the longer 
recall periods used for the first round. Overall, over the three panel waves, the 
sampled households reported 308 incidents (or about 18 percent of all observations) 
of a death or serious illness/injury. While the incidence of mortality and serious 
morbidity may seem high, given the nature of the sample – urban slum dwellers and 
their often physically demanding occupations – this is probably not surprising.  Kabir 
et al. (2000) in their analysis of slum dwellers in Dhaka find that 40 percent of 
sampled individuals reported some kind of illness (i.e. minor and serious) in the past 
14 days. Similarly, in their work on rickshaw pullers in Dhaka, Begum and Sen 
(2004) report a morbidity rate of 11.4 percent on the day of the survey and 39 percent 
over a period of one month, rates which they claim are higher than that for the rural 
poor.  Islam and Maitra (2012) find that 21 percent of households in the rural 
Bangladesh in 2004-2005 survey reported an episode of illness in the past 15 days. 
 The survey then follows on by inquiring about the most important manner in 
which households react to the costs associated with morbidity and mortality. At 39 
percent, the most prominent response is ‘none’ (see Table 3). Since the measure of 
morbidity is any illness that prevents an individual from engaging in normal activities 
and is not sensitive to the duration of the event, no-response may reflect illnesses of 
short duration which did not have particularly onerous financial implications. In terms 
of a more active response, the most common approach is to resort to borrowing from a 
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money lender (about 31 percent) followed by depleting assets or savings (8.4 percent), 
borrowing from NGOs (6.8 percent) and taking help from their social network (5.8 
percent). This is in line with Kabir et al. (2000) who also find that that taking a loan is 
the most common response to cope with illness induced costs amongst slum dwellers 
in Dhaka. They further report that the sale of productive assets is much less common 
than borrowing, while savings are limited and do not provide adequate support in case 
of a serious illness. The semi-structured interviews confirmed this pattern, with the 
respondents pointing out that while borrowing from money lenders at annual average 
interest rates ranging from 30 to 200 percent is not a preferred option, it is the most 
widely used response. The use of this potentially harmful coping option highlights the 
limited access to formal sources of credit and restricted social network, at least with 
regard to finance, of slum dwellers.  
 Table 4 presents the means and standard deviations of some of the key 
variables. The sampled households are relatively poor compared to national patterns. 
In the first survey round 60 percent of the households reported total expenditure that, 
per capita, falls below the 2000 urban poverty line.9 To place this in a national 
perspective, Sen (2003) estimates an urban (rural) poverty headcount of 26 (44) 
percent in 2000.10 A typical sample household is headed by a 43 year old male (87 
percent) and has 4 to 5 members. Educational attainment is low with only about 16 
percent of the heads having completed at least primary school. On average a 
household supplies 80 to 100 hours of labour per week or about 21 hours per capita. 
Depending on the survey round, unearned income contributes to between 6 to 11 
percent of per capita total monthly income. The main sources of this unearned income 
are transfers, social assistance, leasing property or selling assets. Health expenditure 
accounts for 5 to 6 percent of total household spending, with about 10 percent of 
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households allocating more than 15 percent of their budget to health care. The bulk of 
household income is spent on food which accounts for between 50 to 56 percent of 
total non-medical spending. The total reported value of household assets is more than 
twice that of average annual per capita income. About a quarter of total household 
assets can be regarded as productive assets.11 In the first round, loans amount to 54 
percent of per capita annual income while in rounds 2 and 3, the debt-burden appears 
to have increased with loans amounting to 72 to 80 percent of per capita annual 
income.  The unsustainability of borrowing from money lenders and the consequences 
of such a strategy were clearly amplified during field work.  For instance, one of the 
key informants, a male 40 year old male community leader, reported that at times 
households flee in order to escape harassment from money lenders. Additionally, in 
one of the eleven case studies, a 45 year old male respondent stated: 
‘After repaying monthly interest instalment I cannot afford my family. I have 
sent my daughter to her grandparent’s house to reduce food and education 
expenses. It is giving us so much pain and worries like a slow poisoning. I do 
not see any hope escaping from this vicious trap in near future. Sometimes I 
wish we head down together to the railway.’ [Interview conducted on July 23, 
2010]. 
In a number of the 11 case studies, while households mentioned that they were 
able to borrow to meet their immediate needs, this was followed by withdrawal of 
children from school and their induction into the labour force. For instance a 32 year 
female respondent narrated that her mother-in-law had been suffering from severe 
illnesses for one and a half years, which had led to a huge debt burden due to 
treatment costs. After meeting consumption expenses and repaying the monthly loan 
instalment, the earnings from her husband’s rickshaw pulling are insufficient to pay 
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for the medical expenses and education expenses for her son. Consequently, her nine 
year old son began working as a shop assistant.  Similarly, the son of a 45 year old 
female respondent narrated,  
‘I cannot go to school regularly after my mother’s illness, because I have to 
cook and take care of her. Currently, I am working in a nearby mosque to clean 
and carry orders of Imam (religious leader) of the mosque where my father used 
to work.’ [Interview conducted on July 24, 2010]. 
 
III. Methods  
Our empirical analysis assesses (i) the channels of economic risk of morbidity and 
mortality for households, (ii) the ability to smooth consumption when faced with 
these risks, (iii) the coping strategies adopted to deal with morbidity and mortality, 
and (iv) the dynamic effects of using borrowing or depleting assets as a coping 
response. 
 
Income and consumption 
We first test whether morbidity and mortality have a causal effect on per capita 
household income (earned and unearned) and out-of-pocket (OOP) health care 
spending in the last month, the incidence of catastrophic OOP health care spending 
(indicating whether a household spent more than 15 percent of its total consumption 
on health care), and per capita household food and non-food consumption net of 
medical spending. 
The consumption, income and OOP related outcome variables have a typically 
skewed and non-normal distribution censored at zero, which makes linear models 
such as ordinary least squares unsuitable. We therefore use a fixed effects Poisson 
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model (FEP) in order to deal with these distributions and also avoid retransformation 
problems of taking natural logs of the outcome variables (Manning and Mullahy 2001, 
Buntin and Zaslavsky 2004, Mihaylova et al. 2011, Sparrow et al. 2014). An 
advantage of using a FEP model is that the outcome variable does not actually need to 
follow a Poisson distribution; the FEP estimator is consistent under the assumption 
that the conditional mean is correctly specified (Santos Silva and Tenreyro 2006, 
Wooldridge 2002). For the outcome variables per capita household income and 
expenditure we specify the conditional mean as: 
 
𝐸(𝑦𝑖𝑡|ℎ𝑖𝑡, 𝑥𝑖𝑡 , 𝜃𝑐𝑡 , 𝛼𝑖) = exp(ℎ𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽 + 𝑥𝑖𝑡′𝛾 + 𝜃𝑐𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖)  (1) 
 
The vector of the main ill health variables of interest (ℎ𝑖𝑡) includes morbidity 
and mortality indicators for household i in survey wave t. Morbidity is defined as 
serious illness or injury of a household member, while the mortality variable 
combines death of a main earners and that of any other household member (as it is 
reported in Table 2). The β coefficients can be interpreted as a percentage change in y 
due to a unit change in the morbidity and mortality indicators. We further include 
time and community interacted fixed effects (𝜃𝑐𝑡) to capture covariate trends in 
income and expenditure, and household fixed effects (𝛼𝑖). The association between 
self-reported ill health and the outcome variables could be misleading as a causal 
effect if there are unobserved characteristics driving the relationship. For example, an 
individual’s perception of one’s health status will affect self-reporting of illness but 
might itself be affected by socio-economic factors. The households fixed effects 
control for such unobserved confounders since these are typically time invariant. In 
addition, a vector of household characteristics (𝑥𝑖𝑡) controls for important time variant 
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characteristics, such as household size, the demographic profile and a set of non-
health related yet potentially confounding self-reported shocks (loss of crops and 
livestock, loss of assets, bankruptcy and other shocks). 
Two empirical problems remain that are not explicitly addressed by the fixed 
effects strategy. First, the fixed effects estimates will be biased if the vulnerability to 
morbidity and mortality is directly affected by a change in consumption. However, 
such a relationship is typically a long run phenomena and unlikely to be observed 
over the relatively short intervals of the Dinajpur survey waves. Moreover, this bias 
would cause the coefficients to overestimate the effects of morbidity and mortality 
and increase the probability that the null hypothesis of consumption smoothing will be 
rejected. As the next section will show, we do not observe this in the estimation 
results. A second potential problem is state dependence, which occurs when 
preferences are affected by changes in health status. In this case any observed 
correlation between morbidity and consumption could be due to shifting preference 
rather than the economic impacts of morbidity. Unfortunately we were not able to test 
for state dependence. However, other studies of ill health events that are able to test 
do not find evidence of state dependence (see, for example, Gertler and Gruber 2002, 
Gertler et al. 2009, Sparrow et al. 2014).12 
 
Coping strategies 
To assess the role of coping strategies for smoothing consumption in response to 
shocks, we investigate relationship between shocks and coping responses, and why 
households choose a particular coping response over another. 
The various self-reported coping strategies (see Table 3) used by households 
to deal with mortality and morbidity are grouped into four aggregate categories. These 
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are depleting assets and savings, borrowing, other strategies and none. In addition, we 
consider labour supply adjustments (per capita hours worked by household members 
in the past seven days) and changes in the value of assets, both productive and 
consumer durables, as potential outcomes that may be affected by coping behaviour. 
Finally, we use the debt-to-income ratio (total outstanding debt at the time of the 
interview as a ratio of income in the last month) as a measure of the severity of 
indebtedness.  
Which coping strategies do household choose in response to mortality and 
morbidity? The questions for the self-reported coping strategies are asked contingent 
on a respondent reporting a specific shock (see Table 1 for the various shock types). 
While the type of coping strategy reported per shock is mutually exclusive, the coping 
response variables that we consider here are not, because households may face 
multiple shocks during the same recall period. We argue that in case a household 
faces multiple shocks, one particular shock will not only induce an immediate 
response but will also affect households’ options for responding to other shocks, for 
example by tightening the budget constraint or diminishing buffers. We therefore 
generate binary variables that indicate whether households have relied at least once, in 
any of the three panel waves, on each of the four aggregate coping strategy categories, 
irrespective of the type of shock. We then run regressions for each coping strategy to 
assess to what extent these are invoked in response to morbidity and mortality, 
restricting the sample to an unbalanced panel of those observations where any shock 
was reported in the respective survey round. Since labour supply, asset value and the 
debt-to-income ratio also follow skewed and censored distributions, we apply the FEP 
specification presented in equation (1). However, self-reported coping response 
variables (depleting assets and savings, borrowing, other) are binary, in which case 
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we use a linear probability model with household fixed effects. The linear probability 
models include the same control variables and time-community interaction terms as 
the FEP models.13 
Given that households are faced by a specific shock and have an option of a 
range of possible coping strategies, what determines the eventual choice of strategy? 
We can observe this by going back to the original information on the main coping 
response per reported shock, and then focussing solely on morbidity. As explained 
earlier, these self-reported coping strategies are mutually exclusive for each type of 
shock, which would justify a multinomial logit estimation of the determinants of 
coping responses to serious illness (there are too few reported deaths to allow a 
separate analysis of the coping response to mortality). However, this approach implies 
a few caveats and we have to be careful interpreting these estimates as causal effects. 
We cannot control for household fixed effects in the multinomial logit and therefore 
cannot control for any unobserved heterogeneity. We also had to drop the community 
fixed effects for the model to converge. 
Finally, to test for dynamic effects of incurring debt and depleting assets, we 
estimate the effects of changes in the debt-to-income ratio and the value of productive 
assets on future per capita household consumption. We do this re-estimating the FEP 
model in equation (1) for food-, non-food- and total consumption, and including the 
one-period lagged debt-to-income ratio and value of productive assets as additional 
explanatory variables. 
 
IV. Results 
Income and consumption 
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The effects of morbidity and mortality of a household member on measures of 
economic risk – medical spending and income loss – are shown in Table 5. Serious 
illness increases per capita OOP health spending by 96 percent and OOP as a share of 
the household budget by 66 percent. This increase in average medical spending also 
includes some potentially impoverishing health spending events, as the incidence of 
catastrophic health spending increases by 15 percentage points. As may be expected, 
the death of a household member does not affect OOP medical spending. We see an 
opposite pattern for income loss. On average, income is not affected by illness, while 
the recent death of a household member does reduce per capita earned income by 
about 30 percent.14 
Serious illness increases OOP health spending irrespective of the level of 
wealth, and these effects are similar in magnitude to the average effects for the full 
sample (Table 5). We divide the sample into the poorest and wealthiest 50 percent 
based on per capita household (non-medical) expenditures in the first round of the 
survey. The effects on health spending and catastrophic spending incidence are 
slightly larger for the wealthiest half of the sample, but the differences between the 
groups are not statistically significant.  
However, we do see considerable differences for the poorest and wealthiest 
halves of the sample with regard to income loss. For households among the poorest 50 
percent, serious illness leads to a loss of monthly earned income of 11 percent. A 
death of a household member is associated with a negative coefficient for earned 
income, also translating to an 11 percent reduction, although this estimate is not 
precise. In contrast, unearned income for this group increases by 133 percent as a 
result of the death of a household member, possibly due to sales of assets or receiving 
remittances and informal transfers through social networks. There is some evidence of 
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this from the qualitative interviews, which also feature anecdotes of local 
communities and family members collecting donations from local markets, a nearby 
railway station and bus stops, and local mosques for funeral assistance. For instance, a 
neighbour of a 12 year old girl who lives with her two younger brothers and who had 
lost her mother a month before the interview stated,  
‘Her father is physically disabled. He begs on the street and sleeps on railway 
platform. Her mother was the only earning member in the house. At the time of 
her death, she left almost nothing - no money; no foods - except a small shanty. 
We collected some donation for her funerals and gave it to her (the girl) for their 
livelihoods.’[Interview conducted on July 23, 2010]. 
 
For the wealthiest half of the sample we see that a death in the household 
reduces earned income by 41 percent and total income by 40 percent, but we find no 
effects of serious illness on income. Many of the households in this subsample are 
involved in small trading, such as street peddlers with a fixed location and petty trade. 
These mostly informal trade practices operate with the help of household members, 
which may also provide income protection in case of serious illness of other 
household member. A small fraction of households also rely on income from formal 
sector employment, such as low-grade employees with government and semi-
government organisations, which provide some income protection.15 
So far, at least for the sample as a whole (Table 5), we see that morbidity leads 
to a sharp increase in spending on health care and mortality leads to a large decline in 
earned income. Despite these negative effects, irrespective of wealth level (Table 5) 
we find that households manage to smooth their food and non-food consumption 
when faced with serious illnesses. Consumption levels for the poor are not affected by 
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the lost earned income when a productive household member dies, most likely due to 
the offsetting effects of (informal) transfers (Table 5).  Interestingly, we see that the 
death of a household member actually increases per capita non-food consumption for 
the wealthiest half of the sample, presumably because household non-food 
consumption is not easily reduced in the short term, while the number of household 
members is reduced. 
 
Coping strategies 
How do households manage to maintain their consumption levels despite the sharp 
increases in medical spending and reductions in income? Borrowing and depleting 
assets and savings are the two key coping strategies in dealing with the economic risk 
of ill health (Table 6). The incidence of serious illness increases the probability of 
borrowing by 61 percentage points and the debt-to-income ratio by 38 percent. The 
effect emanates mainly from the less-wealthy households where the incidence of 
serious illness increases the probability of borrowing by 76 percentage points and the 
debt-to-income by 62 percent. Serious illness also sparks a depletion of assets and 
borrowings. For the sample as a whole, serious illness increases the probability of 
depleting assets by 27 percentage points. Once again, the effect is much larger for the 
poorer half of the sample although the estimates are not precise. Nevertheless, 
consistent with the increase in the probability of asset depletion, for poorer 
households a serious illness reduces the value of productive assets of 42 percent. The 
estimates show that selling productive assets is a more effective way of raising 
additional revenue as compared to selling consumer durables. The qualitative 
interviews provide anecdotes that are in line with this finding, as some households 
reported selling productive assets such as livestock, poultry, or even a rickshaw to 
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meet medical expenses and smooth consumption. While selling such assets protects 
current consumption it is likely to have a negative bearing on future earnings capacity 
and future consumption. Illness is also associated with an increase in borrowing and 
asset depletion amongst wealthier households but the effects are statistically imprecise.   
For less-wealthy households, the death of a family member increases both the 
probability of borrowing, by 54 percentage points, and depleting assets and savings, 
by 38 percentage points. However, there are no discernible changes in the debt-to-
income ratio or on asset values. For the wealthiest half, we find no clear evidence of 
borrowing or depleting assets and savings as coping strategy. There is a negative 
effect of mortality on labour supply, which can be explained by the loss of an 
economically active household member. 
The determinants of the choice of coping strategy given that a household 
reported a serious illness are presented in Table 7. The table shows marginal effects 
based on multinomial logit estimates where we included the coping strategy option 
“none” as an additional category to complete the full set of options.16 The results 
show little variation in household characteristics across the four strategies, except for 
education of the household head. Increasing education, especially beyond completing 
primary school, increases the probability of borrowing or having no specific response, 
instead of depleting assets. These results are not driven by differences in budget 
constraints, since we control for per capita consumption quartiles.17 The most 
probable explanation is that higher educated households have better awareness and 
access to (informal) financial markets. Educated household heads are more likely to 
be members of local money deposit associations (locally known as Samity) and 
maintain social networks that increase access to credit. Wealthier households, on the 
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other hand, are more likely to sell assets in response to shocks, as for such households 
assets are likely to be relatively abundant. 
 
Dynamic effects of coping behaviour 
While borrowing and selling assets may seem successful coping strategies for the 
poor to smooth consumption, there may be long term implications of incurring debt 
and depleting productive assets.  We find indirect evidence suggesting that these long 
term effects of health related borrowing and asset depletion are indeed a concern. 
Table 8 shows estimates of the effects of changes in the debt-to-income ratio and the 
value of productive assets on future consumption. We included productive assets 
rather than total assets, since productive assets are more relevant for future earnings 
capacity.  
Both increasing debt and reducing productive assets have a statistically 
significant negative effect on future non-food consumption. Per capita non-food and 
total consumption decrease by 1.5 to 0.9 percent if total outstanding debt 6 months 
earlier increases by an amount equal to monthly household income.  The productive 
assets coefficients translate to a decrease in per capita non-food and total consumption 
of 1.7 and 1.3 percent if the value of productive assets would decrease by a value 
equal to lagged mean monthly household income. These effects are slightly larger 
than for increasing debt but the differences are not statistically significant. The 
coefficients for the subsamples are of similar size and signs, but only statistically 
significant for assets. To illustrate what these effects mean in perspective of 
infrequent illness episodes with unexpected large medical spending, we look at 
average OOP spending by households in the top percentile of health care spending. If 
this spending would be fully financed by selling productive assets, then the dynamic 
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effects imply a 0.8 percent decrease in non-food consumption in the next period, and a 
0.6 percent decrease in total consumption. Non-food and total consumption would 
decrease by 0.7 and 0.4 percent if OOP spending would be financed by borrowing.  
While the follow-on effects of debt and depleting productive assets on 
consumption are statistically significant, they seem rather small compared to the 
direct effects of serious illness on income and OOP medical spending. This suggests 
that strategies such as borrowing and selling assets can be successful in protecting 
current consumption from illness induced income loss and medical costs, while the 
medium term costs of protecting consumption are only a fraction of the immediate 
costs of serious illness. However, the longer term effects might be more pronounced, 
especially if debt and loss of assets would inhibit households to return to their original 
consumption paths and the follow-on effects on consumption persist over a number of 
years. 
 
V. Conclusion 
This paper investigates the economic consequences of morbidity and mortality for the 
poor in urban slums of Bangladesh, the manner in which these households respond to 
such events, and how their most common coping strategies – borrowing and drawing 
on assets – affects future consumption. 
We find that the economic risk stems from both medical spending and income 
loss. A serious illness of a household member sharply increases OOP health spending 
and the incidence of catastrophic spending. Moreover, a serious illness exerts a 
negative effect on household income for the poorest half of the sample. A death 
among economically active household members also leads to income loss, by 
reducing labour supply. Despite these non-trivial economic risks, we cannot reject 
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consumption smoothing for these urban households; at least not in the short term. 
However, it would be short-sighted to argue that households are able to rely on 
informal coping strategies to deal with the economic effects of health shocks. The 
most prominent response to finance current needs is to borrow from money lenders 
and to sell productive assets. In turn, the increase in household debt-to-income ratios 
and the loss of productive assets has detrimental effects on future consumption.  
Public health policy in Bangladesh over the last decade has focussed mainly 
on improving nutritional status, child malnutrition, maternity health and family-
planning services, but has been notably absent on issues regarding affordability of 
health care for the urban poor (e.g. Osman 2009, Rashid 2009). Our findings suggest 
that policies geared at providing financial protection from ill health for urban poor, 
such as subsidized health coverage or insurance (e.g. Hamid et al. 2011) and access to 
affordable credit (e.g. Islam and Maitra 2012) could contribute to reducing 
impoverishment and the risk of poverty traps for the urban poor due to morbidity and 
mortality. 
Finally, we highlight two caveats to this study that warrant further research. 
First, while this is (to the best of our knowledge) the only study of the economic risk 
from morbidity and mortality that focusses specifically on poor urban areas, it is also 
limited in its generalizability. The analysis is based on data from urban slum 
communities in just one municipality in Bangladesh, for the time period 2002 to 2003. 
We make a case that the urban and rural contexts differ substantially in health risk, 
access to basic health services and financial protection from mortality and morbidity, 
for example through differences in occupational choices, social networks, flexibility 
of household labour supply and working arrangements, and informal financial 
markets. This calls for additional research in other municipal areas and more recent 
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time periods. Second, the time span of our paper is limited to about 15 months. 
Longer panel data are required to obtain a more complete understanding of the longer 
term effects of informal coping strategies. 
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Notes 
                                                        
1 On the basis of their review of studies from low and middle-income countries 
McIntyre et al. (2006, p. 860) provide a useful illustration of the economic 
consequences and potential coping mechanisms available to households when faced 
by health shocks.  Earlier reviews of the literature on income risk and coping 
strategies in developing countries are provided by Alderman and Paxson (1994), 
Townsend (1995), Morduch (1999), and Dercon (2002).  
2 An exception is Wagstaff (2007) who analyses the effects of morbidity, mortality 
and changes in health status as measured by the body mass index (BMI) on income, 
medical expenditure and consumption in both urban and rural areas in Vietnam.  He 
finds that earned income is negatively affected by health shocks, especially the death 
of a working-age household member, with larger proportionate effects in urban areas. 
The effect of other health shocks on income is not as pronounced. 
3 All figures in the preceding sentences are from http://data.un.org (accessed on June 
11, 2011). 
4 For instance, corresponding figures for India in 2003 were 1 bed and 0.58 physicians 
per thousand persons. Source: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ (accessed 
December 19, 2013).  
5 In 2011 public health expenditure amounted to 36.6 percent of total health 
expenditure while total health expenditure was 3.7 percent of GDP. Source: 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ (accessed December 19, 2013). 
6 The sample size for the survey was designed to support the detection of statistically 
significant changes in child stunting. Nutritional status was chosen as the key variable 
of interest as the objective of the program was to improve food and nutrition security 
(IFPRI 2009). 
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7 These results are not shown here but are reported in the supplemental appendix. 
8 In the survey context, a household is defined as a group of people who live together 
and take food from the ‘same pot’. A household member is defined as an individual 
who has lived in the household for at least 12 months and at least half of the week in 
each week during the 12 month period. 
9 Based on the 2000 urban poverty line of 724.6 Bangladeshi Taka per person/month, 
calculated by Sen (2003) following the cost of basic needs method. This is equivalent 
to US$12.18 on August 1, 2002. If we take a poverty line of US$1 per day, then about 
92 percent of the households in round 1 would classify as poor. 
10 The World Development Indicators estimate the urban and rural poverty headcount 
in 2000 at 35 and 52 percent, respectively. Source: 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx (accessed on December 6, 2013). 
11 Household assets are categorised as either consumer durable (for example furniture, 
kitchenware, jewellery, electronics) or productive asset (for example a sewing 
machine, fishnet, agricultural equipment, rickshaw, boat). 
12 We follow a test proposed by Gertler and Gruber (2002) and Gertler et al. (2009). 
Unfortunately the test was inconclusive as to whether state dependence is an issue for 
our analysis. The intuition behind this test is that if state dependence occurs, we 
expected it to affect the correlation between morbidity and consumption irrespective 
of whether a household is budget constrained in smoothing away morbidity events. 
This implies a test for state dependence, by comparing different subsamples with 
varying (expected) ability to self-insure. For our sample we looked at the poorest and 
wealthiest 50 percent of households in the sample. We rank households based on two 
separate measures: (i) per capita household (non-medical) expenditures in wave 1 of 
the survey, and (ii) the monetary value of asset holdings in wave 1. However, for both 
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wealth measures we cannot reject the consumption smoothing for any of the 
subsamples, which renders the test ineffective. 
13 We are aware that linear probability models could be mis-specified for the binary 
outcomes. Nevertheless we apply a linear specification in order to be able to control 
for household fixed effects. We tried fixed effects logit models as alternative, but 
these did not converge. Horrace and Oaxaca (2006) argue that the potential bias in 
linear probability models increases with the proportion of predicted probabilities that 
falls outside the zero to one interval. They subsequently suggest a trimming estimator 
by dropping those observations outside the interval and re-estimating the linear model 
for the remaining sample. For the self-reported coping response variables 78 to 84 
percent of predicted probabilities fall within the unit interval, compared to 62 percent 
for the incidence of catastrophic OOP spending. The Horrace and Oaxaca trimmed 
estimator yields larger coefficients, yet the interpretation and conclusions remains the 
same. We therefore present the linear probability models in the paper, avoiding 
further loss of observations. 
14 We considered the use of days of work lost due to illness as an alternative 
morbidity variable, as this introduces variation in the intensity of illness. The 
employment module of the survey collects this information for individual household 
members and we constructed a variable that records the average days of work lost for 
household members older than 15 in the last month. The results (reported in the 
supplemental appendix) are robust to choice of illness variable. The coefficients differ 
in magnitude compared to those for the serious illness variable, which is to be 
expected since the units of the two variables are different. However, the sign and 
statistical significance are the same. Moreover, the mortality coefficients are 
unaffected by the change in specification. 
 31 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
15 In addition to the differences in outcomes across expenditure category we also 
estimate the effects of morbidity and mortality separately by education level (no 
education/some education) and type of employment (self-employed/wage worker, 
salaried worker, traders). In classifying these categories of vulnerability we were 
restricted by the sample size and therefore limited the sub-samples for comparison to 
two groups that are of sufficient size (59% of household heads never attended school 
and 37% are self-employed). The results (reported in the supplemental appendix)  
seem to be similar to the estimates for those above and below median expenditure. 
Those who are not self-employed and have relatively higher education spend more on 
health care when they face a health shock. This is not unexpected and most likely 
reflects differences in affordability, just as we observe for wealthier households 
(above median expenditure). The negative effect of the death of a household member 
on income is mostly concentrated amongst the non-self-employed group (above 
median expenditure), most likely due to loss of wages/salaried workers. 
16 To assess possible violations of the irrelevance of independence (IIA) assumption, 
we estimated the MNL model for three options, by combining the Other and None 
categories. These seem the most likely candidates to violate the IIA, as Borrowing 
and Depleting assets are very distinct alternatives. The results (reported in the 
supplemental appendix) show that the marginal effects for depleting assets are almost 
identical for both models. We see only one change in the borrowing equation - the 
effect of higher secondary education. The coefficient is smaller and less precise. All 
other effects remain unchanged. This suggests that the estimates reported in the paper 
are not affected by violation of the IIA assumption. 
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17 We fix the consumption quartiles to those observed in the first panel wave since 
these are more likely to be exogenous to the subsequent coping behaviour than current 
consumption levels. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1 Household reporting to experience unexpected negative events 
Type of shock (recall period) Survey round Total % 
 1 2 3   
Death of main earner in household a  2 5 3 10 1.8 
Death of other household member a  19 8 4 31 5.7 
Serious injury or illness b 147 45 75 267 48.8 
Loss of a regular job b 7 2 6 15 2.7 
Eviction from previous residence b 44 4 0 48 8.8 
Divorce or abandonment b 9 1 3 13 2.4 
Major loss of crops b 2 1 0 3 0.5 
Loss of livestock b 13 5 9 27 4.9 
Loss of productive assets b 3 4 5 12 2.2 
Loss of consumer durables b 17 1 2 20 3.7 
Dowry payment b 5 3 6 14 2.6 
Failure or bankruptcy of business b 1 9 16 26 4.8 
Extortion by mastans/hoodlums c 5 2 0 7 1.3 
Police confiscated assets c 1 0 4 5 0.9 
Household member arrested c 3 1 5 9 1.6 
Paid a large bribe c 4 4 0 8 1.5 
Long duration hartals/strikes c 5 0 0 5 0.9 
Rickshaw broken by picketers c 2 0 0 2 0.4 
Other 5 2 18 25 4.6 
Total 294 97 156 547 100.0 
Notes: Recall periods in the first year are (a) 2 years, (b) 1 year, and (c) 6 months. In the 
second and third survey rounds the recall period for all variables is the six months 
preceding the surveys. 
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Table 2 Households experiencing morbidity and mortality 
Morbidity and mortality  Survey round Total 
 1 2 3  
Death of a household member 21 13 7 41 
 (3.6) (2.3) (1.3)  
Serious illness of a household member 147 45 75 267 
 (25.1) (7.9) (13.6)  
Total 168 58 82 308 
 (28.7) (10.2) (14.8)  
Number of households 585 567 553 1706 
Notes: Figures in parentheses indicate percentage of households. Recall periods in the 
first year are 2 years for a death and 1 year for serious illness of a household member. 
In the second and third survey rounds the recall period for both variables is the six 
months preceding the surveys. 
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Table 3 Main coping response of households affected by morbidity and mortality 
Coping strategy Frequency Percent 
Deplete assets and savings   
Sold/mortgaged productive asset  10 3.2 
Sold/mortgaged consumer durables 8 2.6 
Used savings  8 2.6 
Borrowing   
Took loan from NGOs/institution/employer 22 7.1 
Took loan from mahajan (moneylender) 94 30.5 
Other strategies   
Reduced food consumption 10 3.2 
Sent non-working household member to work 3 1.0 
Took help from others 18 5.8 
Other (non-specified) 14 4.5 
None 121 39.3 
Total 308 100.0 
Notes: Reported frequencies are conditional on households reporting a shock. 
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Table 4 Descriptive statistics of main variables 
 Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 
Variable Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Per capita earned income in last month* 735.65 476.37 686.60 493.09 709.99 588.46 
Per capita unearned income in last  month* 54.31 158.39 51.11 221.66 57.47 169.46 
Per capita food consumption in last week* 89.13 64.17 79.92 89.05 99.95 57.39 
Per capita non-food consumption in last week* 85.29 136.64 78.67 130.86 94.54 324.12 
Per capita OOP health expenses in last week* 10.92 33.47 11.22 31.90 13.15 44.31 
Share of OOP health expenses of total consumption 0.05 0.08 0.06 0.10 0.05 0.10 
Incidence of catastrophic health spending (OOP share>15%) 0.10 0.29 0.10 0.31 0.10 0.29 
Outstanding loans* 5135.02 13274.56 6394.13 22513.61 7437.33 17431.87 
Debt to income ratio 1.66 3.27 2.43 12.93 3.19 10.25 
Total value of all assets* 18862.55 34099.29 19943.63 35112.46 21818.92 37928.71 
Total value of productive assets* 1620.61 4730.29 2216.93 8198.14 2764.02 8495.13 
Per capita hours worked in last week 21.51 13.95 20.34 13.87 20.61 12.80 
Age of household head 42.48 12.62 43.02 12.39 43.36 12.37 
Male household head 0.86 0.35 0.86 0.34 0.87 0.34 
Household size 4.26 1.77 4.47 1.82 4.61 1.86 
Head completed primary school 0.10 0.30 0.09 0.29 0.10 0.29 
Head completed secondary school 0.05 0.21 0.05 0.21 0.05 0.21 
Head completed higher secondary school 0.01 0.12 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.11 
Observations 585 567 553 
Notes: (*) Figures are in Bangladeshi Taka (BDT); 1 Euro = 58.18 BDT on August 1, 2002. 
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Table 5 Effects of serious illness and death of household members on per capita household consumption and income 
 OOP health spending Income Consumption 
 Total Share CHS 15% Earned Unearned Total Food Non food Total 
Serious illness 0.961 0.660 0.148 -0.040 0.058 -0.034 0.048 0.076 0.056 
 (0.160)** (0.120)** (0.033)** (0.045) (0.200) (0.048) (0.044) (0.090) (0.051) 
Death  -0.286 -0.419 -0.077 -0.301 0.069 -0.288 -0.009 0.867 0.382 
 (0.468) (0.358) (0.071) (0.130)* (0.434) (0.133)* (0.112) (0.281)** (0.175)* 
Observations 1608 1579 1666 1659 1180 1659 1627 1658 1626 
Households 540 534 590 557 396 557 550 557 550 
Poorest 50%          
Serious illness 0.859 0.703 0.120 -0.106 0.026 -0.103 0.058 0.028 0.042 
 (0.192)** (0.173)** (0.048)* (0.051)* (0.269) (0.052)* (0.060) (0.097) (0.055) 
Death  -0.516 -0.223 0.012 -0.107 1.329 -0.040 0.002 0.074 -0.002 
 (0.642) (0.437) (0.075) (0.145) (0.467)** (0.131) (0.105) (0.162) (0.091) 
Observations 785 777 824 821 584 821 813 820 812 
Households 263 262 286 275 196 275 274 275 274 
Richest 50%          
Serious illness 1.003 0.682 0.188 0.004 0.098 0.011 -0.020 0.003 -0.014 
 (0.202)** (0.167)** (0.045)** (0.063) (0.305) (0.071) (0.058) (0.128) (0.072) 
Death  0.077 -0.295 -0.124 -0.406 -0.684 -0.397 -0.016 1.030 0.522 
 (0.511) (0.421) (0.104) (0.181)* (0.734) (0.186)* (0.154) (0.298)** (0.206)* 
Observations 794 788 818 806 575 806 800 806 800 
Households 267 265 287 271 193 271 269 271 269 
Model FE Poisson FE Poisson Linear FE FE Poisson FE Poisson FE Poisson FE Poisson FE Poisson FE Poisson 
Notes: Table shows coefficients from Poisson models with household fixed effects and fixed effects linear probability models. Other covariates 
omitted from the table include other shocks, household size, demographic composition of the household and time-community interaction terms. 
Statistical significance:  +,* and ** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Robust standard errors in brackets. 
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Table 6 Coping strategies for serious illness and death of household members 
 Self-reported coping strategies Economic buffers and indebtedness 
 Deplete assets 
and savings 
Borrowing Other Labour supply All assets Productive 
assets 
Debt to income 
ratio 
Serious illness 0.268 0.613 -0.084 -0.075 0.011 -0.100 0.382 
 (0.104)* (0.129)** (0.115) (0.041) (0.023) (0.098) (0.164)* 
Death  0.230 0.258 -0.038 -0.175 -0.004 -0.316 0.016 
 (0.101)* (0.211) (0.147) (0.100) (0.034) (0.281) (0.303) 
Observations 477 477 477 1653 1654 909 1427 
Households 345 345 345 555 555 304 484 
Poorest 50%        
Serious illness 0.246 0.763 0.250 -0.107 -0.036 -0.415 0.624 
 (0.172) (0.156)** (0.209) (0.060) (0.032) (0.136)** (0.250)* 
Death  0.375 0.543 -0.255 -0.076 0.028 0.050 -0.200 
 (0.182)* (0.240)* (0.335) (0.166) (0.038) (0.247) (0.425) 
Observations 239 239 239 818 818 491 710 
Households 171 171 171 274 274 164 241 
Richest 50%        
Serious illness 0.107 0.453 -0.136 -0.086 0.028 -0.122 0.154 
 (0.170) (0.297) (0.201) (0.062) (0.032) (0.168) (0.199) 
Death  -0.164 -0.235 0.140 -0.257 -0.044 -0.906 0.319 
 (0.182) (0.344) (0.221) (0.118)* (0.055) (0.524) (0.300) 
Observations 229 229 229 803 806 415 707 
Households 167 167 167 270 271 139 239 
Model Linear FE Linear FE Linear FE FE Poisson FE Poisson FE Poisson FE Poisson 
Notes: Table shows coefficients from Poisson models with household fixed effects and fixed effects linear probability models. Other covariates 
omitted from the table include other shocks, household size, demographic composition of the household and time-community interaction terms. 
For self-reported coping strategies the sample is restricted to households that reported a shock in the respective survey round. 
Statistical significance:  +,* and ** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Robust standard errors in brackets. 
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Table 7 Determinants of choice of coping strategy in response to serious illness 
 Deplete assets Borrowing Other None 
Age household head 0.0002 0.004 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Male household head -0.033 0.112 -0.052 -0.027 
 (0.058) (0.097) (0.062) (0.093) 
Household size -0.0001 -0.018 0.001 0.017 
 (0.009) (0.018) (0.011) (0.019) 
Head completed     
Primary school -0.032 0.103 0.020 -0.090 
 (0.061) (0.103) (0.072) (0.105) 
Secondary school -1.085 0.545 0.071 0.470 
 (0.200)** (0.146)** (0.141) (0.156)** 
Higher secondary school -0.941 1.172 -1.486 1.255 
 (0.181)** (0.253)** (0.209)** (0.220)** 
Quartile     
2 0.011 -0.033 0.073 -0.051 
 (0.046) (0.085) (0.058) (0.086) 
3 0.024 0.105 0.008 -0.138 
 (0.044) (0.089) (0.054) (0.083)+ 
4 0.108 -0.127 0.059 -0.040 
 (0.062)+ (0.084) (0.062) (0.091) 
Round     
2 0.032 -0.031 0.066 -0.068 
 (0.064) (0.082) (0.064) (0.085) 
3 -0.063 0.097 0.137 -0.171 
 (0.034)+ (0.070) (0.056)* (0.067)* 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0576    
Observations 261    
Notes: Table shows marginal effects from a multinomial logit model. 
Statistical significance:  +,* and ** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively. Robust standard errors in brackets. 
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Table 8 Effects of lagged debt to income ratio and assets on per capita household 
consumption 
 Food Non food Total 
Full sample    
Debt to income ratio 0.003 -0.015 -0.009 
 (0.004) (0.007)* (0.004)* 
Productive assets (×1000) 0.003 0.006 0.004 
 (0.002) (0.002)** (0.002)** 
Observations 1056 1078 1054 
Households 528 539 527 
Poorest 50%    
Debt to income ratio 0.013 -0.025 -0.007 
 (0.019) (0.027) (0.017) 
Productive assets (×1000) 0.005 0.006 0.004 
 (0.02) (0.06) (0.03) 
Observations 524 534 522 
Households 262 267 261 
Wealthiest 50%    
Debt to income ratio 0.001 -0.013 -0.007 
 (0.003) (0.008) (0.005) 
Productive assets (×1000) 0.004 0.005 0.005 
 (0.002)* (0.002)** (0.002)** 
Observations 520 524 520 
Households 260 262 260 
Notes: Table shows coefficients from Poisson models with household fixed effects. 
Other covariates omitted from the table include other shocks, household size, 
demographic composition of the household and time-community interaction terms. 
Statistical significance:  +,* and ** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively. Robust standard errors in brackets. 
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Supplemental appendix (not for publication but available online) 
 
Table A1 Test for attrition bias: probability of dropping out of the sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Age household head -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.012 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Male household head -0.171 -0.174 -0.175 -0.221 -0.184 
 (0.224) (0.225) (0.226) (0.219) (0.237) 
Head completed 0.413 0.407 0.418 0.408 0.407 
Primary school (0.264) (0.263) (0.264) (0.267) (0.265) 
 0.252 0.263 0.245 0.168 0.244 
Secondary school (0.371) (0.377) (0.376) (0.367) (0.363) 
 0.451 0.439 0.416 0.349 0.468 
Higher secondary school (0.580) (0.613) (0.594) (0.567) (0.585) 
 -0.145* -0.153* -0.145* -0.121 -0.117 
Household size (0.070) (0.069) (0.069) (0.067) (0.070) 
  0.199    
Serious illness  (0.189)    
  0.298    
Death  (0.439)    
   0.001   
OOP health spending   (0.002)   
    0.0002  
Earned income    (0.0002)  
    -0.00003  
Unearned income    (0.0004)  
     0.001 
Food spending     (0.001) 
     -0.001 
Non-food spending     (0.001) 
 -0.766* -0.821* -0.770* -0.938* -0.677 
Constant (0.364) (0.378) (0.365) (0.395) (0.418) 
 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.012 
Pseudo R-squared 0.048 0.055 0.050 0.054 0.054 
Observations 585 585 585 585 573 
Notes: Probit estimates. The explanatory variables are taken for the first survey wave 
only. The outcome variable is a dummy variable that takes value one if a household is 
not observed in all three survey waves. 
Statistical significance:  +,* and ** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively. Robust standard errors in brackets. 
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Table A2. Effects of serious illness and death of household members: Using average work days lost to illness for working age household 
members (age>15) in last month 
 OOP health spending Income Consumption 
 Total Share CHS 15% Earned Unearned Total Food Non food Total 
  Days lost to illness 0.107 0.069 0.023 -0.009 0.034 -0.004 -0.007 0.041 0.018 
 (0.027)** (0.018)** (0.005)** (0.010) (0.033) (0.011) (0.008) (0.035) (0.022) 
  Death  -0.486 -0.568 -0.092 -0.295 0.040 -0.283 -0.015 0.856 0.375 
 (0.567) (0.380) (0.073) (0.128)* (0.439) (0.132)* (0.114) (0.274)** (0.173)* 
Observations 1608 1579 1666 1659 1180 1659 1627 1658 1626 
Households 540 534 590 557 396 557 550 557 550 
Model FE Poisson FE Poisson Linear FE FE Poisson FE Poisson FE Poisson FE Poisson FE Poisson FE Poisson 
Notes: Table shows coefficients from Poisson models with household fixed effects and linear fixed effects models. Other covariates omitted 
from the table include other shocks, household size, demographic composition of the household and time-community interaction terms. 
Statistical significance:  +,* and ** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Robust standard errors in brackets. 
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Table A3. Effects of serious illness and death of household members: By employment type (self-employed vs not self-employed) 
 OOP health spending Income Consumption 
 Total Share CHS 15% Earned Unearned Total Food Non food Total 
Serious illness 0.961 0.660 0.148 -0.040 0.058 -0.034 0.048 0.076 0.056 
 (0.160)** (0.120)** (0.033)** (0.045) (0.200) (0.048) (0.044) (0.090) (0.051) 
Death -0.286 -0.419 -0.077 -0.301 0.069 -0.288 -0.009 0.867 0.382 
 (0.468) (0.358) (0.071) (0.130)* (0.434) (0.133)* (0.112) (0.281)** (0.175)* 
Observations 1608 1579 1666 1659 1180 1659 1627 1658 1626 
Households 540 534 590 557 396 557 550 557 550 
Self-employed          
  Serious illness 0.340 0.171 0.042 -0.004 1.023 0.024 0.102 0.039 0.068 
 (0.339) (0.237) (0.056) (0.058) (0.542) (0.063) (0.072) (0.120) (0.077) 
  Death 1.454 0.582 0.122 -0.066 0.788 -0.038 0.026 1.406 0.687 
 (0.740)* (0.636) (0.107) (0.229) (1.005) (0.224) (0.157) (0.515)** (0.314)* 
Observations 464 464 557 483 311 483 483 483 483 
Households 171 171 253 179 114 179 179 179 179 
Not self-employed          
  Serious illness 0.868 0.562 0.159 -0.049 -0.039 -0.056 -0.028 0.053 0.006 
 (0.189)** (0.149)** (0.045)** (0.061) (0.324) (0.068) (0.058) (0.095) (0.061) 
  Death -1.114 -0.748 -0.190 -0.350 -0.439 -0.359 -0.048 0.558 0.232 
 (0.559)* (0.390) (0.113) (0.122)** (0.842) (0.130)** (0.080) (0.261)* (0.137) 
Observations 901 876 1000 950 658 950 922 949 921 
Households 325 317 413 343 236 343 334 343 334 
Model FE Poisson FE Poisson Linear FE FE Poisson FE Poisson FE Poisson FE Poisson FE Poisson FE Poisson 
Notes: Table shows coefficients from Poisson models with household fixed effects and linear fixed effects models. Other covariates omitted 
from the table include other shocks, household size, demographic composition of the household and time-community interaction terms. The 
sample is divided into the self-employed and non self-employed (wage worker, salaried worker, and trader) based the head’s main occupation. 
Statistical significance:  +,* and ** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Robust standard errors in brackets.  
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Table A4. Effects of serious illness and death of household members: By education level (never attended primary level vs some education) 
 OOP health spending Income Consumption 
 Total Share CHS 15% Earned Unearned Total Food Non food Total 
Serious illness 0.961 0.660 0.148 -0.040 0.058 -0.034 0.048 0.076 0.056 
 (0.160)** (0.120)** (0.033)** (0.045) (0.200) (0.048) (0.044) (0.090) (0.051) 
Death  -0.286 -0.419 -0.077 -0.301 0.069 -0.288 -0.009 0.867 0.382 
 (0.468) (0.358) (0.071) (0.130)* (0.434) (0.133)* (0.112) (0.281)** (0.175)* 
Observations 1608 1579 1666 1659 1180 1659 1627 1658 1626 
Households 540 534 590 557 396 557 550 557 550 
No education          
  Serious illness 0.839 0.670 0.153 -0.050 -0.015 -0.049 0.042 0.005 0.015 
 (0.191)** (0.163)** (0.046)** (0.054) (0.246) (0.055) (0.060) (0.103) (0.064) 
  Death  0.270 -0.224 0.017 -0.257 -0.325 -0.274 -0.086 1.359 0.551 
 (0.497) (0.305) (0.035) (0.110)* (0.537) (0.110)* (0.067) (0.369)** (0.226)* 
Observations 930 907 968 970 688 970 944 969 943 
Households 313 308 345 326 231 326 320 326 320 
Some education          
  Serious illness 1.032 0.646 0.133 -0.006 0.238 -0.006 0.061 0.087 0.082 
 (0.219)** (0.177)** (0.050)** (0.068) (0.290) (0.075) (0.061) (0.151) (0.089) 
  Death  -0.626 -0.558 -0.155 -0.326 0.467 -0.286 0.049 0.166 0.088 
 (0.461) (0.409) (0.118) (0.213) (0.466) (0.226) (0.173) (0.265) (0.191) 
Observations 678 672 698 689 492 689 683 689 683 
Households 227 226 245 231 165 231 230 231 230 
Model FE Poisson FE Poisson Linear FE FE Poisson FE Poisson FE Poisson FE Poisson FE Poisson FE Poisson 
Notes: Table shows coefficients from Poisson models with household fixed effects and linear fixed effects models. Other covariates omitted 
from the table include other shocks, household size, demographic composition of the household and time-community interaction terms. The 
sample is divided into households where the head has never attended primary level and some education. 
Statistical significance:  +,* and ** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Robust standard errors in brackets.
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Table A5. Determinants of choice of coping strategy in response to serious illness: 
Combining categories None and Other  
 Deplete assets Borrowing None/Other 
Age household head 0.0002 0.004 -0.004 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Male household head -0.033 0.110 -0.078 
 (0.058) (0.097) (0.100) 
Household size -0.0001 -0.018 0.018 
 (0.009) (0.018) (0.018) 
Head completed    
Primary school -0.033 0.102 0.070 
 (0.061) (0.103) (0.108) 
Secondary school -1.065 0.518 0.547** 
 (0.196)** (0.143)** (0.170) 
Higher secondary school -1.071 0.424 -0.646 
 (0.202)** (0.258) (0.228)* 
Quartile    
2 0.011 -0.035 0.024 
 (0.046) (0.085) (0.088) 
3 0.024 0.105 -0.129 
 (0.044) (0.089) (0.088) 
4 0.108 -0.123 0.015 
 (0.062)+ (0.085) (0.092) 
Round    
2 0.033 -0.031 -0.002 
 (0.064) (0.082) (0.088) 
3 -0.062 0.098 -0.035 
 (0.034)+ (0.071) (0.072) 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0479   
Observations 261   
Notes: Table shows marginal effects from a multinomial logit model. 
Statistical significance:  +,* and ** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively. Robust standard errors in brackets. 
